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Introduction Background
Background
What is adverse selection?
No commonly accepted standard definition of adverse selection.
Definition (Actuarial perspective)
Insurer faces loss due to risk not factored in at the time of sale due to
asymmetric information between the insurer and the insured.
Definition (Economic perspective)
An individual’s demand for insurance (the propensity to buy
insurance and the quantity purchased) is positively correlated with
the individual’s risk of loss (higher risks buy more insurance).
Question:
Why is this a bad outcome and for whom?
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Introduction Background
Background
Arguments against adverse selection:
If insurers cannot charge risk-differentiated premiums, then:
higher risks buy more insurance, lower risks buy less insurance,
raising the pooled price of insurance,
lowering the demand for insurance,
usually portrayed as a bad outcome, both for insurers and for society.
In practice:
Policymakers often see merit in restricting insurance risk classification
EU ban on using gender in insurance underwriting.
Moratoria on the use of genetic test results in underwriting.
Question:
How can we reconcile theory with practice?




Why do people buy insurance?
What drives demand for insurance?
How much of population losses is compensated by insurance
(with and without risk classification)?
Which regime is most beneficial to society?
We find:
Social welfare is maximised by maximising loss coverage.
Definition (Loss coverage)
Expected population losses compensated by insurance.
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Why do people buy insurance? Assumptions
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Why do people buy insurance? Assumptions
Why do people buy insurance?
Assumptions
Consider an individual with
an initial wealth W ,
exposed to the risk of loss L
with probability µ,
utility of wealth U(w), with U ′(w) > 0 and U ′′(w) < 0,
an opportunity to insure at premium rate pi.
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Why do people buy insurance? Expected utility: Without insurance
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Why do people buy insurance? Expected utility: With insurance
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Why do people buy insurance? Maximum premium tolerated
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What drives demand for insurance? Modelling demand for insurance
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What drives demand for insurance? Modelling demand for insurance
Modelling demand for insurance
Simplest model:
If everybody has exactly the same W , L, µ and U(·), then:
All will buy insurance if pi < pic ;
None will buy insurance if pi > pic .
Reality: Not all will buy insurance even at fair premium. Why?
Heterogeneity:
Heterogeneity can arise for many reasons.
Here we focus on perception of risk.
Perception of risk:
Suppose for a group of individuals (all else being equal):
the underlying risk of loss is a constant µ∗, but
perception of risk is a random variable µ ∼ F .
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What drives demand for insurance? Demand is a survival function
Demand is a survival function
Condition for buying insurance:
Given a premium pi, an individual chosen randomly will buy insurance
if perceived risk µ > µc(pi), where:
U (W − piL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
With insurance
= (1− µc(pi))U(W ) + µc(pi)U(W − L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Without insurance
.
Demand as a survival function:
Given a premium pi, insurance demand, d(pi), is the survival function:
d(pi) = Prob[µ > µc (pi)],
i.e. those individuals who perceive their risks to be greater than the
threshold risk µc(pi) will purchase insurance.
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What drives demand for insurance? Demand is a survival function














d(pi) = P[µ > µc(pi)]
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What drives demand for insurance? Illustrative example
Illustrative example: W = L = 1
Power utility function:
U(w) = −(1− w)
γ+1
γ + 1
, 0 ≤ w ≤ 1, γ ≥ 0.








, x > µmin > 0, α > 0.
Demand for insurance:
d(pi) = Prob[µ > µc (pi)] ∝ pi−λ, for λ = α(γ + 1) > 0.
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What drives demand for insurance? Illustrative example
Illustrative example: W = L = 1
Demand elasticity (Iso-elastic demand):
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk classification
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk classification
Risk classification
Consider a population of individuals with the same:
initial wealth W = 1;
potential loss L = 1;
form of iso-elastic demand function d(pi) ∝ pi−λ; and
demand elasticity λ.
Suppose the population can be divided into 2 risk-groups, with:
risk of losses: µ1 < µ2;
population proportions: p1 and p2;






, i = 1,2.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk-differentiated premium
Risk-differentiated premium
Equilibrium:
If risk-differentiated premiums pi1 and pi2 are allowed,
Total premium:
∑
i pi di(pii) pii .
Total claims:
∑
i pi di(pii) µi .
Equilibrium is achieved when insurers break even, i.e. pii = µi .
Adverse Selection:
No losses for insurers. No (actuarial/economic) adverse selection.
Loss coverage (Population losses compensated by insurance):
Loss coverage =
∑
i pi di(µi) µi =
∑
i pi τi µi .
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium
Pooled premium
Equilibrium:
If only a pooled premium pi0 is allowed,
Total premium:
∑
i pi di(pi0) pi0.
Total claims:
∑
i pi di(pi0) µi .
Equilibrium is achieved when insurers break even, i.e.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium
Pooled premium: Adverse selection
Adverse selection: Summary
The pooled equilibrium is greater than the average premium
charged under full risk classification:
pi0 > α1µ1 + α2µ2 ⇒ (Economic) adverse selection.
No losses for insurers! ⇒ No (actuarial) adverse selection.
Adverse selection is not useful to measure social efficacy of insurance.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Loss coverage ratio
Loss coverage ratio
Loss coverage (Population losses compensated by insurance):
Loss coverage =
∑
i pi di(pi0) µi .
Loss coverage ratio:
C =
Loss coverage for pooled premium




i pi di(pi0) µi∑
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µ1 = 0.01 µ2 = 0.04
α1 = 0.8
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Loss coverage ratio
Loss coverage ratio: Summary
Summary
λ < 1⇒ Loss coverage is more when risk classification is banned.
λ = 1⇒ Loss coverage is the same in both risk classification regimes.
λ > 1⇒ Loss coverage is more when full risk classification is used.
Empirical evidence suggests λ < 1, providing justification for restricting
risk classification.
The maximum value of loss coverage ratio depends on the relative risk
and relative size of the risk groups.
A pooled premium might be highly beneficial in the presence of a small
group with very high risk exposure.
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Which regime is most beneficial to society? Social welfare
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Which regime is most beneficial to society? Social welfare
Social welfare
Definition (Social welfare)






d(µi , pii)U(W − Lpii)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insured population




Linking social welfare to loss coverage
Setting U(W − L) = 0 and assuming Lpii ≈ 0 gives:
G = U(W )
∑
i
pid(µi , pii)µi + Constant,
= Positive multiplier× Loss coverage+ Constant.
Loss coverage provides a good proxy (which depends only on observable data) for
social welfare (which depends on unobservable utilities).
Result: Maximising loss coverage maximises social welfare.
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Conclusions
Conclusions
Adverse selection need not be adverse
Restricting risk classification
will always increase adverse selection;
increases loss coverage if λ < 1.
Summary
Loss coverage provides a better metric than adverse selection in
measuring social welfare.
P Tapadar (University of Kent) Why Adverse Selection Need Not Be Adverse ATRC, July 2015 31 / 32
Conclusions
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